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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEGREGATION - "SEPARATE BUT
EQUAL" DOCTRINE MODIFIED. A perceptible modification of the
United States Supreme Court's attitude toward the doctrine of
separate but equal facilities in the segregation of races raises some
doubt ag to the present effect of the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.
Since 1896, when the Supreme Court therein decided that segregation
of races was constitutional so long as the treatment was equal within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts have given
unanimous adherence to the doctrine.!
The Supreme Court's wavering patronage of the Plessy v. Fergu-
son doctrine was first evidenced in the 1938 decision of Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada,' where Chief Justice Hughes, while expressly
reaffirming the constitutionality of segregation, declared that a negro
had been deprived of equal protection of the laws when in seeking a
legal education he was forced to submit to a plan whereby the state
of Missouri could, at its option, pay his tuition in an out-of-state
school. As an alternative, the Board of Curators of the negro state
college in Missouri could establish a negro law school and it was
contended that the exercise of this alternative was contemplated.
Rejecting the resort to out-of-state facilities as no more than a miti-
gation of the discrimination, the court held that merely an intention
to establish a law school within the state was not equal protection
and the petitioner was ordered admitted to the state university.
Having thus forecast a more stringent attitude towards the
degree of equality necessary to comply with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court 10 years
later in Sipuel v. Board of Regents' decided that a negro had not
been afforded equal protection by an Oklahoma plan only slightly
dissimilar to that found in Missouri. The lone distinguishing feature
of the Oklahoma plan was that the state was under an obligation,
if the negro so chose, to set up a separate school for negroes within
the state. The court found that it would not be necessary for the
negro to insist on a separate school for negroes before he applied for
admission to the law school at the state university. Petitioner was
ordered admitted to the university pending the establishment of a
separate law school for negroes in the state. Later, in Fischer v.
Hurst,' it was held that the law school subsequently set up for
negroes was in compliance with the court's directive in the Sipuel
case.
In Sweatt v. Painter' and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,'
both decided in 1950, the Supreme Court evidenced what must be
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Mitchell v. United States, 313
U.S. 80 (1941); Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied on other grounds, 340 U.S. 912 (1950) No cases have been
found which directly dispute the finding in Plessy v. Ferguson that segre
gation is constitutional.
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
4 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
333 U.S. 147 (1948).
6 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
7 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
See Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 22 (D.C.Cir. 1950) (dissenting opin
ion).
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considered a practical repudiation of the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine
as applied, at least, to education in professional schools. Both cases,
it would seem, could be distinguished from instances of segregation
in liberal arts colleges, high schools and elementary schools. But
the Sweatt and McLaurin cases would be strong persuasive authority
in such cases and support already can be found in the lower courts
for an extension of the principles to these cases.!
The petitioner in the Sweatt case complained that the facilities
afforded negro law students in Texas were not in fact equal to those
available at the state university. In affirming this contention, the
court cited as deficient at the negro school: (1) reputation of the
faculty; (2) experience of the administration; (3) position and in-
fluence of the alumni; (4) standing of thei school in the community;
and (5) opportunity for interplay of ideas with other students.
The negro petitioner in the McLaurin case had been previously
refused entrance to the graduate school at Oklahoma University,
although no other state school offered the course which he sought.
Following an adverse decision in the courts, the Oklahoma law re-
quiring segregation was amended to allow the petitioner to enter
the graduate school on a segregated basis. He was required to sit
apart in classrooms,9 in the cafeteria and' in the library.
In refusing to recognize this as equal protection of the laws, the
court said, "But they (the restrictions imposed on petitioner) signify
that the state in administering the facilities it affords for professional
and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from other students. The
result is that the appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective
graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability
to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students, and in general, to learn his profession . . . We hold that
under these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes
differences in treatment by the state based upon race. Appellant,
having been admitted to a state supported school, must receive the
same treatment at the hands of the state as the students of the other
races. ' ,"
It should be made clear that the "separate but equal" doctrine
threads through each of these decisions and in fact, in the Sweatt
case, the court refused to consider the constitutionality of segrega-
tion but contented itself with determining if the facilities of the two
races were equal. But the true impact of the two cases is to impose
unattainable conditions precedent upon the luxury of segregation,
at least insofar as it applies to professional schools. It would seem
to need no argument, for example, that generous expenditures and
fabulous facilities would be insufficient to equal the reputation of
the University of Texas faculty, the position and influence of the
school's alumni and the experience of its administration, all of
which were only part of the inequalities set out by the court in the
Sweatt case.
Segregation, however, takes on many forms and the tendency is
to oversimplify the field. Plessy v. Ferguson, for example, a case of
intrastate commerce, was a valid exercise' of the state's police power
and included an express finding that no inferiority was implied to-
ward the negro race. Yet subsequent cases, many distinguishable
An unfortunate incident occurred in this respect when the school author-
ities erected a wooden railing around petitioner's seat in the classroom
and posted a sign "reserved for colored".339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
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on all the above counts from Plessy v. Ferguson, were decided by
courts who felt themselves bound by the court in the Plessy case.
The dissenting opinion in Carr v. Corning"1 suggests the probability
that two schools are less likely to be "equal" facilities, than two
railroad cars which are. exactly alike." Similarly, public recreational
accomodations and private businesses are other categories which
seem to require separate treatment.
If it is to be assumed that Plessy v. Ferguson settled the consti-
tutionality of segregation, federal courts have no jurisdiction in
many matters of segregation. Thus where state law requires segre-
gation in affairs wholly within the state and affords equal treatment
to both races, the state, by its police power, has sole jurisdiction.'
Where the state has undertaken to supply certain accommodations to
its citizens, the federal courts have jurisdiction to review the ade-
quacy of the facilities provided for negroes and determine if negroes
have been given equal protection of the laws within the Fourteenth
Amendment.' In view of the decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer" and
similar cases,' the definition of state action has been broadly ex-
tended and the jurisdiction of the federal courts increased. Federal
courts have also steadfastly refused to yield to the states the right
to regulate interstate commerce."
SOME DIFFICULTIES OF EQUAL PROTECTION
As has previously been indicated, it is little consolation to the
states to know that segregation is constitutional if for some purposes
equal facilities are more a myth than a possibility." The largest
single factor in reaching this anomalous result has been the concept
that the right to be protected by the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a personal right." Hence proportional or
even superior accommodations for negroes as a group are insufficient
if in any respect an individual member of the negro race is being
deprived of something available to the other race.'
In Henderson v. United States," which was decided upon a pro-
vision of the Interstate Commerce act,2' it was held that a negro
182 F.2d 14, 31 (D.C.Cir. 1950).12 Id at 31.
is Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).24 Rice v. Arnold, 45 S.2d 195 (Fla. 1950), rev'd without opinion, 340
U.S. 848 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Draper v.
City of St. Louis, 92 F.Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 19 U.S.L.
Week 2467 (Cal. Mar. 26, 1951).
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485
(1877). But cf. Bob-lo Excursion/ Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948)
(insulated segment of foreign commerce).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92
F.Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950), aff'd mem, 340 U.S. 909 (1951); Draper
v. City of St. Louis, 92 F.Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950) (contemplated
swimming pool for negroes would not be equal protection to negroes
living closer to white swimming pool)
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); see McCabe v.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
" Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Law v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 78 F.Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1948).
339 U.S. 816 (1950).
5" 4 Stat. 902, 49 U.S.C. §3 (1) (1946).
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had been deprived of equal protection of the laws in a railroad train
dining car, where he had been denied service because the two tables
conditionally set aside for negroes were filled but space was avail-
able at tables set aside for whites. In rejecting the contention that
sometimes whites had to wait while the negro tables were empty,
the court said, "Discriminations that operate to the disadvantage of
two groups are not the less to be condemned because their impact
is broader than if only one were affected."2 Similar wording can be
found in Mitchell v. United States4 and McKissick v. Charmichael.
Another obstacle in the quest for equal facilities is the require-
ment that there must be no implication of inferiority towards the
negro race.' Although this principle has been sparingly employed,"
it was the basis for Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson.' In the words of Justice Harlan, "The thing to accomplish
was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for the whites
and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while travel-
ling in railroad coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as
to assert the contrary."+'
Assuming that Plessy v. Ferguson was correctly decided and that
no inferiority was in fact implied in that case, it is probable that
many cases since litigated and which have cited Plessy v. Ferguson
could have been distinguished on this point. It is significant in this
respect that no cases have been found where white persons have
complained of segregation.
SEGREGATION AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Courts have been quick to strike down any movement of the
state legislatures in the field of interstate commerce and acts re-
quiring or prohibiting segregation in interstate commerce have been
invalidated alike.' On the other hand, the carriers themselves would
seem to have a free hand to impose reasonable rules of segregation,"
although even this principle was successfully challenged in a 1949
Circuit Court of Appeals decision."
= 339 U.S. 816, 825 (1950).
4 313 U.S. 80 (1941) at 97, "We take the chief reason for' the Commis
sion's action was the 'comparatively little colored traffic'. But the
comparative volume of traffic cannot justify the denial of a fundamental
right of equality of treatment, a right specifically safeguarded by pro,
visions in the Interstate Commerce Act."
23 187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951) "The duty of the federal courts is clear.
We must give first place to the rights of the individual citizen, and when
and where he seeks only equality of treatment before the law, he must
prevail. It is for him to decide in which direction his advantage lies."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27 See Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dissenting
opinion).
' 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896).
Ibid. i.e. Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950), involved city
recreational facilities and court decided it was bound by Plessy v. Ferguson
and refused to distinguish between the two cases. Subsequently the
United States Supreme Court refused certiorari because of untimely ap-
plication.
'0 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877) (prohibiting segregation); Morgan
v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (requiring segregation).
Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 171 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948); Simmons
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 75 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Va. 1947).
Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, Inc., 177 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949)
(carrier's segregation was crystallization of unwritten state law based on
custom and was indistinguishable from segregation statute).
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As was pointed out in Morgan v. Virginia," the court does not
assume to pass upon the validity of segregation in declaring such
statutes to be unconstitutional. Rather, the court is finding that
because of the varying conditions in the many states, the problem
requires uniform legislation by the Congress. Any attempt by the
states to legislate in this field must be regarded then as violative
of the federal government's exclusive right to regulate interstate
commerce. Where, however, the interstate or foreign commerce is
local in nature, an exception is made."
The courts appear tq make no distinction between the modes of
transportation. Thus, Hall v. DeCuir," the earliest Supreme Court
decision in this field, was a steamboat case; Chiles v. Chesapeake and
Ohio Railway Co." was a railroad case; and Morgan v. Virginia" was
a bus case. Air transportation has left little litigation in this field.
Nash v. Air Terminal Services," a federal district court decision, was
a case of exclusion of a negro from a federal airport restaurant
but did not involve a regulation of interstate commerce.
Segregation in labor bargaining units of interstate carriers has
been given the go-ahead, it would seem, in Steele v. L. & N. Ry." In
that case, a railroad brotherhood, from which negroes were excluded,
was enjoined from acting contrary to the interests of negro em-
ployees, where the brotherhood has been given exclusive bargaining
rights. The court indicated that the brotherhood could determine
its own membership.
STATE LEGISLATION IN FIELD OF SEGREGATION
Since segregation survived its first Supreme Court test in Plessy
v. Ferguson, over half of the states have deemed themselves author-
ized to pass statutes on the subject.'1 States which require segregation
encounter the problem of separate but equal facilities for each race;
and states which prohibit segregation must define the extent of the
applicability of the statute.
Although, of course, the problem in the latter category varies
with the wording of each statute, state courts have held that school
segregation is unlawful; 2 that segregation on a golf course only
nominally private was illegal;" that a negro girl was entitled to social
privileges of white students in a non-segregated high school;" that
a refusal to sell beer to negroes was unlawful;" that negroes could
not be excluded from a race track;" that a theater is a public ac-
commodation within a state civil rights law; that a swimming pool
328 U.S. 373 (1946).
Bob-Lo Excursiori Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
3 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
" 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
328 U.S. 373 (1946).
85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
40 Id at 206.
41 See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 382 (1946) (statutes collected).
42 Webb v. School Dist. No. 90, 167 Kan. 395, 206 P.2d 1066 (1949)
(gerrymandering of school districts); Hedgepeth v. Bd. of Educ. of
Trenton, 131 N.J.L. 153, 35 A.2d 622 (1944).4 Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio 1950).
Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 Pac. 386 (1927).
McCrary v. Jones, 39 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio 1941).
" Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 45 Cal. App. 2d 283, 114 P.2d 27
(1941).4 Bailey v. Washington Theater Co., 218 Ind. 513, 34 N.E.2d 17 (1941.).
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is included within public accommodations from which a negro could
not be excluded;" that an ice cream parlor is not a "place of enter-
tainment or amusement";" and that a dentist's office is not a public
accommodation."
Instances where courts have been called upon to pass on statutes
or ordinances requiring segregation include holdings that a negro
had to be admitted to law school where there was no provision for a
negro law school in the state;" that restricting a golf course six days
to whites and one day to negroes was not equal protection of the
laws;" that a negro girl could not be excluded from the state's only
school for nursing;" that a state could regulate intrastate commerce;"
that a city could maintain a segregated recreational program;" that
a state could exclude a Chinese girl from a white high school under
segregation laws;" that negroes are not deprived of equal protection
of the laws until their request for separate facilities has been
denied or until such facilities prove inadequate."
WHO IS A NEGRO?
It is readily understandable, in view of the many distinctions
based upon color of skin," that much importance lies in determining
who is a negro. Plessy, the negro complainant in Plessy v. Ferguson,
was himself only one-eighth negro and the Virginia statutes classify
a person as a negro who has any quantum of negro blood." And in
State v. Treadway' a colored person was said to be one with "negro
blood pure or mixed . . . no matter what may be the proportion ...
so long as the negro blood is traceable."' The definition of a colored
person has been broadened to include a Chinese girl ' and a California
school district tried to exclude children of Mexican descent from the
white school."
It has been suggested" that tests which imply that being a negro
is an indication of inferiority are unconstitutional as not in com-
pliance with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Aside from the constitutional considerations, which have
4 Draper v. City of St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950); State v.
Rosecliff Realty Co., 1 N.J.S. 94, 62 A.2d 488 (1948).
49 Brown v. Meyer Sanitary Milk Co., 150 Kan. 931, 96 P.2d 651 (1939).
" Rice v. Rinaldo, 95 N.E.2d 30 (Ohio 1950).51 Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936).
Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1950), rev'd without opinion, 340
U.S. 848 (1950).
McCready v. Byrd, 73 A.2d 8 (Md. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827
(1950).
New v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 186 Va. 726, 43 S.E.2d 872 (1947).
Boyer v. Garrett, 183' F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied on other
grounds, 340 U.S. 912 (1950).
Gong Lur v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
57 Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 465, 218 S.W.2d 30 (1949).53 Hawkins v. Bd. of Comm. of Florida, 47 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1950).
Cohen, An Appraisal of the Legal Tests Used to Determine Who Is "a
Negro, 34 Corn. L.Q. 246 (1948).
Va. Code 067 (Michie, 1942).
a, 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910) (case contains lengthy discussion of
definitions of negroes and colored persons).
" Id at 502.
o Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
, Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
Cohen, An Appraisal of the Legal Tests Used to Determine Who Is a
Negro, 34 Corn. L.Q. 246 (1948).
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some merit in light of the express wording of the Plessy v. Ferguson
case, strong support can be found for the argument that blood is not
affected in any way by negro commingling.'
CONCLUSION
In summary, it should be said, as was pointed out in Boyer v.
Garrett," that Plessy v. Ferguson continues unrepudiated by the
Supreme Court. However, certain substantial revisions have been
made in its effect' and further changes can be expected."' Thus
segregation in professional schools has apparently been abandoned
but all other forms of segregation, which do not unduly restrain
interstate commerce, continue to be sanctioned so long as the facilities
afforded the several races are equal within the purview of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
It is submitted that the cautious tack of the United States
Supreme Court into the raging tempest of segregation merits
commendation." Without compromise of legal principles and without
attempting to revolutionize mores which have been deeply inbred
in some sections of the United States, the court has bettered the
position of the negro and held out realistic hope of continued
advancement in his struggle for acceptance in our society. In Sweatt
v. Painter'.and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education," the court has, in effect, opened the door to schools of
professional training to the negro. And axiomatically the negro who
will enter these schools is one who will have worked hard to attain
a position where he can insist on admittance to a school heretofore
forbidden to persons of his race and can be expected to be a credit
to his -race. At the same time, the Court has retained the broad
doctrine of segregation and would seem to be in a position to extend
the principle of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases at a time of its own
choosing. Daniel J. Chapman.
a See quotations set out in 34 Corn. L.Q. 246, 253 (1948).
67 Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied on other
grounds, 340 U.S. 912 (1950).Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
69 See Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dissenting opin-
ion).
See Draper v. City of St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950) (where
swimming pool was opened to negroes and race riots had resulted, yet
court ordered pool reopened, if at all, on non-segregated basis).
" 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
72 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
